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LAW REVIEW
ARE RETIREMENT FUNDS EXEMPT FROM THE REACH
OF CREDITORS IN MISSISSIPPI?
Richard A. Montague, Jr. *
One court has stated, "The ERISA' quicksand is fast swallowing up
everything that steps in or near it."2 After grappling with ERISA is-
sues another court concluded that "quicksand may not [have been]
all that it ... stepped into."3
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1. ERISA- The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).
2. Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
3. In re Volpe, 100 Bankr. 840,842 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). Chief Bankruptcy Judge Larry E. Kelly of the
Western District of Texas expresses the frustration of many bankruptcy judges and practitioners who have dealt
with issues addressed in this article. As stated by Judge Kelly: "The issues before the Court are complicated be-
cause of the less than clear interplay between certain provisions of ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code, and the Texas
Property Code." Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Are private retirement and pension funds exempt from the reach of creditors in
Mississippi? Are IRA's exempt? Although Congress and most state legislatures
have enacted laws placing retirement funds, public and private, beyond the reach
of creditors,4 the majority of bankruptcy court decisions have produced a contrary
result. 5 In a recent Mississippi bankruptcy case, In re McLeod, a federal district
4. See discussion below regarding ERISA anti-alienation provisions, Bankruptcy Code exclusions and ex-
emptions and the Mississippi exemptions relating to private retirement funds, beginning at note 18.
5. Recent cases holding retirement funds available to the bankruptcy trustees include:
Second Circuit: In re Tisdale, 112 Bankr. 61 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (deferred contribution account not spend-
thrift trust under Connecticut law, therefore not excluded from the estate; portion of plan contributions made by
employer excluded as spendthrift trust).
Third Circuit: In re Velis, 109 Bankr. 64 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded where
debtor had control over plan); White v. Babo (In re Babo), 97 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (ERISA-quali-
fled plan not excluded; not exempt); In re Atallah, 95 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (IRA not excluded;
applicable nonbankruptcy law means only state spendthrift trust law).
Fourth Circuit: Tyler v. Putman (In re Putman), 110 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (interest in ERISA-
qualified profit-sharing plan excluded to extent that transfer restrictions enforceable under state law) (overruled
by Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Fifth Circuit: Brooks v. Interfirst Bank (In re Brooks), 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988) (ERISA-qualified plan not
spendthrift trust, debtor had sufficient control over plan to be settlor); Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574
(5th Cir. 1983) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust); Judson v. Witlin (In re
Witlin), 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981) (Keogh plan not exempt because self-settled spendthrift trust void as to
creditors); Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. McLeod (In re McLeod), 102 Bankr. 60 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989)
(ERISA-qualified plan and IRA not exempt; state exemption preempted); Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 99
Bankr. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not spendthrift trust, therefore not excluded; ERISA
plan not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A) and Texas exemption preempted); In re Connally, 94 Bankr. 908 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1989) (deferred compensation not spendthrift trust, therefore property of estate); In re Komet, 93
Bankr. 498 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Komet I) (withdrawn).
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Sixth Circuit: In re Gribben, 84 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded, not
exempt); In re Smith, 103 Bankr. 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not
spendthrift trust); In re Leimbach, 99 Bankr. 796 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (ERISA plan not excluded because
not spendthrift trust); In re Sellers, 107 Bankr. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (vested interest in ERISA-quali-
fled profit-sharing plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust); In re Witte, 92 Bankr. 218 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1988) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust); In re Slezak, 63 Bankr. 625
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust; not exempt under §
522(b)(2)(A)); In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded be-
cause not spendthrift trust).
Seventh Circuit: Morter v. Farm Credit Servs., 110 Bankr. 390 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (retirement fund excluded as
spendthrift trust; annuity included in estate because annuity not a trust under New York law); In re Silldorff, 96
Bankr. 859 (C.D. 111. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust); In re Tomer, 117
Bankr. 391 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust); In re
Smith, 115 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift
trust); In re Pulley, Ill Bankr. 715 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (portion of ERISA plan ESOP not excluded because
not spendthrift trust under Indiana law); In re Gifford, 93 Bankr. 636 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (ERISA-qualified
plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust).
Eighth Circuit: In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989) (statutory retirement fund not excluded because
not spendthrift trust under Minnesota law); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (ERISA-qualified plan
not excluded unless spendthrift trust, not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A); Weir v. O'Brien (In re O'Brien), 94
Bankr. 583 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded where corporate veil pierced to make spend-
thrift provisions unenforceable); In re Boykin, 118 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan
not excluded because not spendthrift trust); In re Nuttleman, 117 Bankr. 975 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (ERISA-
qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust, ERISA did not preempt Nebraska pension exemption
statute); Wear v. Green (In re Green), 115 Bankr. 1001 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not ex-
cluded because not spendthrift trust, no discussion of ERISA preemption); In re Fritsvold, 115 Bankr. 192
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust under Minnesota law,
state ERISA exemption preempted by ERISA); In re Hartman, 115 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990)
(ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust under Arkansas law); Berman v. Mead (In re
Mead), 110 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift
trust under Missouri law); In re Gaines, 106 Bankr. 1008 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (ERISA preempted state ex-
emption statute; fraudulent conduct resulted in disallowed exemptions); Federman v. Gallagher (In re Gal-
lagher), 101 Bankr. 594 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift
trust and turnover did not disqualify the plan); Brown v. Shelter Ins. Employees Retirement Plan (In re Ken-
drick), 106 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (ERISA plan included, no discussion of spendthrift trust or
ERISA preemption).
Ninth Circuit: In re Ullman, 116 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded be-
cause not spendthrift trust); In re Conroy, 110 Bankr. 492 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan ex-
cluded only to extent of employer's contribution, state exemption preempted); Watson v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid),
96 Bankr. 1014 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust); Kaplan
v. Primerit Bank (In re Kaplan), 97 Bankr. 572 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because
not spendthrift trust); Siegel v. Swaine (In re Siegel), 105 Bankr. 556 (D. Ariz. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not
excluded because not spendthrift trust and Arizona ERISA exemption preempted by ERISA); Fogler v. Flindall
(In re Flindall), 105 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spend-
thrift trust, state exemptions preempted); Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1985) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust, not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A)).
Tenth Circuit: Williams v. Threet (In re Threet), 118 Bankr. 805 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (ERISA-qualified
plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust); In re McIntosh, 116 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)
(ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust and not exempt under § 522(b)(2), state ex-
emption laws preempted by ERISA); Martin v. Verwer (In re Martin), 115 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990)
(ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust, state exemption preempted by ERISA); In re
Mata, 115 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (IRA not excluded because not spendthrift trust; state IRA exemp-
tion statute with different rules for debtors in and out of bankruptcy invalid; In re Walker, 108 Bankr. 769 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1989) (IRA or annuity not excluded because not spendthrift trust and exemptions not governed by
ERISA are not preempted); In re Alagna, 107 Bankr. 301 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not
excluded because not spendthrift trust; plan not exempt under § 522 (b)(2)(A) and state exemption preempted);
In re Weeks, 106 Bankr. 257 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spend-
thrift trust; state exemption preempted); In re Toner, 105 Bankr. 978 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (ERISA-qualified
plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust; not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A);, ERISA preemption not dis-
cussed); In re Brown, 95 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989) (state exemption preempted, plan not exempt
under § 522(b)(2)(A), § 541 (c)(2) not discussed).
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Eleventh Circuit: Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11 th Cir. 1985) (ERISA-quali-
fied plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust; not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A)); Stilson v. Gulf States
Paper Corp. (In re Pilkington), 89 Bankr. 911 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not
spendthrift trust under Alabama law); In re Schlein, 114 Bankr. 780 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (exemption statute
preempted by ERISA); In re Seilkop, 107 Bankr. 776 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (state exemption for annuity not
unconstitutional and state pension exemption not preempted); In re Martinez, 107 Bankr. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1989) (state exemption not preempted by federal law where no conflict between state and federal law); In re Bry-
ant, 106 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust
and state exemption statute preempted); In re Sheppard, 106 Bankr. 724 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (ERISA-quali-
fled plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust and state exemption statute preempted).
Contra: D.C. Circuit: Tatge v. Cheaver (In re Cheaver), 121 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. D.C. 1990) (ERISA transfer
restrictions are "applicable nonbankruptcy law" and provide exclusion of the plan from the bankruptcy estate un-
der § 541 (c)(2)).
Second Circuit: In re Kleist, 114 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1990) (qualified employee benefit funds con-
clusively presumed to be spendthrift trust under New York law and excluded from estate under § 541 (c)(2)).
Third Circuit: In re Hysick, 90 Bankr. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (ERISA-qualified plan also spendthrift trust
under Pennsylvania law, plan excluded under § 541(c)(2)).
Fourth Circuit: Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990) (restrictions on transfers in
ERISA-qualified plans constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law," plan excluded under § 541 (c)(2)).
Fifth Circuit: In re Felts, 114 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan exempt under §
522(b)(2)(A); In re Kirk, 101 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (ERISA-qualifted plan excluded as spend-
thrift trust); In re Volpe, 100 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (state exemption not preempted by ERISA,
ERISA plan and IRA exempt).
Sixth Circuit: In re Messing, 114 Bankr. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan exempt under
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A)); In re Elmore, 108 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan ex-
cluded as valid spendthrift trust under Ohio law); In re Stansberry, 101 Bankr. 508 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989)
(ERISA-qualified plan excluded where all requirements for spendthrift trust under Tennessee law were met ex-
cept technical filing requirements); Chrysler-UAW Pension Plan v. Watkins (In re Watkins), 95 Bankr. 483
(W.D. Mich. 1988) (debtor's interest in ERISA-qualified plan excluded as spendthrift trust under Michigan law).
Seventh Circuit: In re LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan excluded as spendthrift
trust under Indiana law).
Eighth Circuit: Jacobs v. Shields, 116 Bankr. 134 (D. Minn. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan excluded as spend-
thrift trust under Michigan law); In re Vickers, 116 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan
not excluded because not spendthrift trust, but ERISA did not preempt state ERISA exemption); In re Bartlett,
116 Bankr. 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan excluded as spendthrift trust; ERISA did not
preempt generic Iowa pension exemption); Boon v. Miner (In re Boon), 108 Bankr. 697 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(ERISA-qualified plan excluded as spendthrift trust under Missouri law); Baron v. Moorman Mfg. Co. (In re
Colsden), 105 Bankr. 500 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (ERISA-qualified plan excluded as spendthrift trust under state
law); In re Montgomery, 104 Bankr. 112 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan annuity excluded as
spendthrift trust under New York law); In re Loe, 83 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (ERISA-qualified plan
not excluded because not spendthrift trust, but trustee had no immediate right of turnover).
Ninth Circuit: In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan excluded as spendthrift
trust).
Tenth Circuit: In re Starkey, 116 Bankr. 259 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded be-
cause not spendthrift trust, state exemption preempted by ERISA, but ERISA benefits exempt under §
522(b)(2)(A)); In re Dickson, 114 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (state retirement plan exempt even
though not spendthrift trust because state plan exemption not preempted by ERISA); In re Burns, 108 Bankr. 308
(Bankr. W.D. Oki. 1989) (ERISA-qualified plan not excluded because not spendthrift trust, state exemption pre-
empted by ERISA, but ERISA exemption allowed under § 522(b)(2)(A)).
Eleventh Circuit: In re Spears, 121 Bankr. 896 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (plans which qualified as spendthrift
trusts excluded from estate); In re Williams, 118 Bankr. 812 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (ERISA-qualified plan not
excluded because not spendthrift trust, state exemption statute not preempted); In re Ewell, 104 Bankr. 458
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (state IRA exemption not preempted by ERISA); In re Griggs, 101 Bankr. 393 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1989) (anti-alienation provision of ERISA-qualified plans enforceable, therefore, funds in plan are
excluded).
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court affirmed the bankruptcy court decision that a Chapter 7 debtor's IRA and
Keogh funds are available for distribution to his creditors.6
Despite apparently clear statutory language providing that retirement funds are
beyond the reach of creditors, the courts have been reluctant to protect retirement
funds from creditors in cases in which the beneficiaries exercised some degree of
control over the funds. Although most of the cases holding that retirement funds
are not excluded or exempt have involved self-directed plans, the same reasoning
could be applied to group plans that do not qualify as spendthrift trusts under state
law,7 with far reaching effects. The IRS contends that a bankruptcy filing by an
individual member of a group pension plan whose interest in the plan is neither
excluded nor exempt may create a transfer that disqualifies the entire plan from
favorable tax treatment.8 As a result, each plan participant may owe tax on the in-
come which had previously been deferred in the plan. This position has been re-
jected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and several bankruptcy courts. 9
The problem could conceivably affect great numbers of people and large sums
of money. Department of Labor statistics show that in the United States in 1987
there were 733,000 private retirement plans (with two or more participants) with
a total of seventy-seven million participants. 10 These plans controlled an estimated
$1,539,700,000,000 in assets." The end-of-1989 estimates show an increase in
participants to seventy-nine million and an increase in assets to two trillion dol-
lars. 
12
The 1987 figures for Mississippi show a total of 3,436 private retirement
plans.13 The majority (2,031) were plans with between one and nine participants;
6. See discussion of Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. McLeod, (unreported) (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 1990)
(Civil Action No. H89-0183(W)), Order dated February 27, 1990, at note 46 and following. This was nota final
judgment from which an appeal could be taken, and the case is now back in bankruptcy court on cross motions for
summary judgment.
7. A spendthrift trust is "[a] trust created to provide a fund for the maintenance of a beneficiary and at the
same time to secure it against his improvidence or incapacity . . . . " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1400 (6th ed.
1990). In Mississippi, as in most other states, spendthrift provisions are void in trusts in which the settlor is the
beneficiary. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 386 So. 2d 1112, 1115 (Miss. 1980) and Deposit Guaranty
Nat'l Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204 So. 2d 856, 860 (Miss. 1967).
8. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-067 (Sept. 26, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-035 (Mar. 10, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-
31-020 (May 5, 1981).
9. See Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982) (dealing with state retirement funds); Williams v. Threet
(In re Threet), 118 Bankr. 805 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); Federman v. Gallagher (In re Gallagher), 101 Bankr.
594 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); White v. Babo (In re Babo), 97 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Gribben,
84 Bankr. 494 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); and see also infra note 92.
10. United States Department of Labor statistics, from a telephone interview with analyst Dan Belier, October
29, 1990. Participant figures include active and retired participants, along with those who have separated from a
company but still have vested pension rights. There is some double-counting of participants since some partici-
pate in more than one plan.
11. 1990 Statistical Abstract of the United States, citing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Flow of Funds Accounts, Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1957-83; Annual Statistical Digest; and unpub-
lished data.
12. Department of Labor, Belier supra note 10.
13. The ERISA Red Book of Pension Funds 1988/1989 Market Analysis Report Section. Dun's Marketing Ser-
vices, Dun & Bradstreet, 49 Old Bloomfield Ave., Mt. Lakes, NJ 07046. Information in this volume is compiled
from filings with the Department of Labor of Form 5500, a plan's annual report to the government.
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thirty-nine had 500 or more participants. 14 There were 715 plans with assets of
between $100,000 and $249,999. Five hundred and forty-three plans had assets
of between $1,000 and $24,999, and six plans had assets totaling $25 million or
more.
15
This article analyzes the Deposit Guaranty case, the statutory tension between
ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code and the Mississippi exemption laws'6 as they relate
to ERISA-qualified plans and attempts made by other states to resolve the prob-
lems. Finally, the article discusses legislative options which may clarify the law in
Mississippi. '
II. DID CONGRESS AND THE MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE EXEMPT ERISA-
QUALIFIED RETIREMENT FUNDS FROM THE REACH OF CREDITORS?
A. Favorable Tax Treatment of Erisa-qualified Plans Is
Conditioned on Plan Language Restricting Alienation of Benefits
Congress illustrates its intent that retirement funds should be protected from
creditors in several anti-alienation provisions in laws regarding both public and
private pension plans and in the Bankruptcy Code. Also, thirty-one states purport
to exempt private retirement funds.'" As part of ERISA, Congress established a
set of criteria for retirement or pension benefit plans, which if satisfied, confer on
those plans tax benefits to the employer and employee. '" When a plan satisfies the
criteria, the plan is referred to as a "tax qualified plan," an "ERISA-qualified
14. Id. The number of participants and corresponding number of plans in 1987 were: 1-9, 2,031 plans; 10-
24,510; 25-49, 291; 50-99, 143; 100-499, 183; 500and up, 39. The total number ofplans does notequal 3,436
(the number filing Form 5500) because some sponsors failed to indicate the number of participants.
15. Id. The number of Mississippi plans and range of assets they controlled in 1987, were: 543 plans with
assets of $1,000-$24,900; 384 at $25,000-$49,999; 542 at $50,000-$99,999; 715 at $100,000-$249,999; 367
at $250,000-$499,999; 216 at $500,000-$999,999; 152 at $1 milion-$4.9 million; 22 at $5 million-$9.9 mil-
lion; 6 at $10 million-$24.9 million; 6 at $25 million plus. The number of plans does not equal 3,436 (the num-
ber filing Form 5500) because not all sponsors listed assets.
16. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1989).
17. See infa note 93.
18. Sterbacb, Weiss & Salerno, Pre-Bankruptcy Planning for Professionals and ERISA Qualified Pension
Plans: Are State Created Statutory Exemptions D. O.A. in Bankruptcy Proceedings?, 94 COM. L.J. 229, 251 n.93
(1989) [hereinafter Sterbach, Weiss & Salerno, Pre-Bankruptcy Planning]. See also appendix to the excellent
article by Sterbach, Weiss & Salerno, which provides a snapshot of the retirement fund exemption, whether there
has been a ruling on the ERISA preemption issue, and if not, whether a ruling is likely or possible. Id. at 257-67.
19. See generally 26 U.S. C. § 401(a) (1988).
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plan," or simply a "qualified plan." One of the requirements of a qualified plan is
that the plan provides that the benefits be beyond the reach of creditors.2
B. The Bankruptcy Code Excludes from Property
of the Estate Property in a Trust with Transfer Restrictions
Enforceable Under 'Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law"
Two bankruptcy code sections dealing with exclusions and exemptions, 11
U. S.C. §§ 541 (c) (2) and 522, illustrate congressional intent to protect retirement
funds. 11 U.S.C. § 541 defines the property interests of the debtor which become
property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) provides:
The commencement of a case creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the
following property wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equi-
table interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.2'
Excluded from the broad definition of estate property is property in a trust with
transfer restrictions enforceable under a nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. §
541 (c)(2) provides:
A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is en-
forceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under ...
[the Bankruptcy Code]. 22
Most courts have limited the applicability of § 541 (c)(2) to trusts which qualify as
spendthrift trusts under state law.23 According to the vast majority of courts, if a
20.26 U.S.C. §401(a)(13), which requires compliance in return for tax qualification, provides the following
anti-alienation/anti-assignment rule: "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the
plan . . . may not be assigned or alienated." The Treasury Regulation issued relative to § 401(a)(13) (1988)
provides:
Under Section 401(a)(1 3), a trust will not be qualified unless the plan of which the trust is a part provides that
benefits provided under the plan may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or equitable process.
Treas. Reg. 1.40(a)-13(b)(1) (1979).
Title 1, section 206(d)(1) of ERISA applies to all pension benefit plans and provides: "Each pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d)(l) (1988).
See, e.g., Sterbach, Weiss & Salerno, Pre-Bankruptcy Planning at 235 n.24.
A sample anti-alienation provision in an ERISA-qualified plan is as follows:
Subject to the exceptions provided below, no benefit which shall be payable out of the Trust Fund to any per-
son (including a participant or his beneficiary) shall be subject in any manner to anticipation, alienation, sale,
transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance, or charge, and any attempt to anticipate, alienate, sell, transfer,
assign, pledge, encumber or charge the same shall be void; and no such benefit shall in any manner be liable
for, or subject to, the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements, or torts of any such person, nor shall it be
subject to attachment or legal process for or against such person, and the same shall not be recognized by the
Trustee, except to such extent as may be required by law.
This provision shall not apply to the extent a participant or benefieicary is indebted to the Plan, for any rea-
son, under any provision of this Agreement. This provision shall not apply to a "qualified domestic relations
order" defined in Code Section 4 1 4 (p) and those other domestic relations orders permitted to be so treated by
the Administrator under the provisions of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984.
In re Leimbach, 99 Bankr. 796, 798 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
21. 11 U.S.C. §541(a).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
23. Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); see also supra note 5.
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debtor's retirement funds are held in a plan or trust that qualifies as a spendthrift
trust under state law, then those funds are not property of the bankruptcy estate.24
The Fourth Circuit has recently interpreted § 541(c)(2) more broadly to exclude
ERISA-qualified plan benefits from property of the estate under § 541 (c)(2) with-
out considering whether the plan also qualified as a spendthrift trust.2"
C. The Federal "Generic Exemption Scheme"Excludes
Retirement Funds to the Extent Reasonably
Necessary for Support of the Debtor
11 U.S.C. § 522 itemizes a debtor's available exemptions. The exemption
framework provides for two different exemption systems allowing exemptions
from up to three sources. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) contains a list of exemptions known
as the generic exemptions. The generic bankruptcy exemption relating to retire-
ment funds provides evidence of congressional intent to protect retirement funds
from creditors, with limits:
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section;
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(E) a payment under stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or
contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or the length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor, unless -
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider
that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or contract
arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401 (a), 403(a), 403(b),
408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 403(a),
403(b), 408, or 409).26
This exemption is available only to debtors in states whose legislatures have not
voted to limit the exemptions available to their debtors to the exemptions provided
by state law and by their debtors to the exemptions provided by state law and by
federal nonbankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code provides that states can "opt
out" of the generic exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) provides:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate . . .
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State
law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifi-
cally does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this
24. Id.
25. Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
26.11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
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section, or state or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition
27
Mississippi, along with most other states, has "opted out" of the federal exemp-
tions and thereby has eliminated the availability of the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemp-
tions for Mississippi debtors.28
D. Mississippi Law Exempts All ERISA-qualified
Property and Pension Trusts
The Mississippi legislature has attempted to exempt ERISA benefits. The Mis-
sissippi legislature echoed Congress in exempting ERISA benefits but expanded
the exemption by eliminating the requirement that the funds be reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor. The Mississippi exemption available to debtors
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) for retirement funds provides:
(1) There shall be execution or attachment:
(b)(iii) All property and pension trusts which are qualified under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (P.L. No. 93-406), including, but
not limited to, self-employment retirement (Keogh) plans and individual retirement
accounts (IRA). However, no contribution made to any such plan, account or trust
shall be exempt if made less than one (1) calendar year from the date of filing for
bankruptcy, whether voluntary or involuntary, or less than one (1) calendar year
from the date of service of any writ of execution, attachment or garnishment on the
person having such plan, account or trust in his possession or under his control.29
In light of the ERISA anti-alienation provisions, the bankruptcy exclusions and
exemptions for retirement trusts, why have so many bankruptcy and appellate
courts refused to allow debtors to keep their retirement plans? Remember the
ERISA quicksand? We have only just begun to sink. Consider the following hy-
pothetical.
III. In re Spentitall
Attorney Mel Practice represents Trustburst Guaranty Bank of Mississippi.
The President of the Bank, I. M. Gullible, tells Practice the Bank just received a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy notice from Dr. I. Spentitall, a Jackson plastic surgeon. Dr.
Spentitall owes the Bank $1 million and change. The Bank has as collateral a five-
story office building, whose only tenant, Dr. Spentitall, just moved out. The Bank
also has a second lien on Dr. Spentitall's ten percent interest in a perpetual energy
machine. Dr. Spentitall makes $350,000 a year lifting faces and other body parts.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (2)(A) (emphasis added).
28. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1(2) (Supp. 1989) provides:
(2) In accordance with the provisions of Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended
(11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) [11 USCS § 522(b)]), residents of the State of Mississippi shall not be entitled to the
federal exemptions provided in Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended (11
U.S.C.A. § 522(d) [11 USCS § 522(d)]). Nothing in this subsection shall affect the exemptions given to
individuals of Mississippi by the Constitution and statutes of the State of Mississippi.
See infra note 32 for a list of other states that have opted out of the generic exemptions.
29. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1989).
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Dr. Spentitall has $1.2 million in a retirement plan established by a professional
corporation of which he is the only employee. He also has $65,000 in an IRA.
Dr. Spentitall is claiming his retirement funds and IRA as exempt property.
Mr. Gullible wants to know if the doctor can do that. Gullible has talked to I. M.
Crafty, Dr. Spentitall's attorney, who assured Gullible that retirement funds are
exempt. Crafty even gave Gullible the Mississippi Code section that says retire-
ment funds are exempt.3" Gullible tells Practice all this and wants to know what
can be done to stop this injustice. Surely the good doctor cannot walk out on his
creditors and keep over a million dollars in his retirement fund.
Mel Practice reviews the Code section and realizes things look bad for good ol'
Trustburst Guaranty Bank of Mississippi. Mississippi Code Section 85-3-1(1)
says that all property and pension trusts qualified under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) are exempt, except for contributions made
a year prior to filing.3
Mel Practice reads on to section 85-3-1(2) which states that "residents of the
State of Mississippi [will] not be entitled to the federal exemptions provided in sec-
tion 522(d) of the Bankruptcy [Code] . . . " in accordance with section
522(b)(1). 32 That is no help. Why on earth would the good doctor want to use the
federal exemption if he can keep all that retirement money? Mel Practice calls his
old buddy and client, Gullible, and reminds him that they both should have taken
chemistry in college, because if they had, they would both be doctors and could
have all that money in their retirement accounts just like that fat sucker, Dr. Spen-
titall. "Let's go get a drink," says Practice.
However, all is not lost. Del I. Gent, Mel Practice's new associate, did not stop
his research with the Mississippi exemption statute and the Bankruptcy exemption
statute. He figured that a $1.2 million plum is worth a little more research, so
while Practice and Gullible were having a few cold sodas, he read with interest the
ERISA statute and discovered 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), which says:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section
shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). This is the "opt-out" provision referred to in the text at note 28. Mississippi has
joined 34 other states by opting out or limiting the exemptions to debtors to those available under state law. Other
states that have opted out include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. It is unclear whether Alaska has opted
out. See 7 CoLL ER oN BANKRuvrcy 19 (15th ed. 1990).
33.29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988)) (emphasis added).
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Del I. Gent checked his calendar and discovered that it was 1991. Hmmm.
What does "relate to" mean? Gent ran this section through WESTLAW and out
popped Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service. 34 "Relate to" is broadly in-
terpreted in Mackey. According to Mackey, "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan."3"
The Mississippi exemption statute refers specifically to ERISA."3 Therefore, it
is preempted."' The bank gets its money, and Del I. Gent makes partner.
"Ah, but there is more," says Crafty. "What about 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1),
Mr. Gent? What about that? Did you skip over that section while you were read-
ing ERISA? Surely you passed section 1056 on your way to section 1144. Or,
were you reading the statute backwards? You must have gone to school in another
state." Section 1056(d)(1) states that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that bene-
fits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."38
"So what?" asks Gent.
"Here's what," says Crafty. "Take another look at section 522 of the Bankruptcy
Code." Section 522(b) states that "[n]otwithstanding section 541 of this title, an
individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate . . . (2)(A) [a]ny prop-
erty that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or
State or local law that is applicable . . . ."
Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA is federal law, it is not subsection (d) of 11 U.S.C.
§ 522, and it prohibits alienation of funds in qualified pension plans.4" "Slam
dunk, Mr. Gent," says Crafty. "The retirement fund is an ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plan, so the doctor keeps his retirement money."
"Oh, but no," says Gent, who has just run ERISA section 206(d)(1) through
WESTLAW. Out popped In re Goff.4 "Read Goff and weep," says Gent as he
thumbs through his Hawaiian travel brochures and ponders how he will spend all
his bonus money.
Crafty read Goff and he wept.
"Why did the Fifth Circuit say all that stuff about 'other federal law,' when the
Goffs were claiming that their ERISA-qualified plan should not be property of the
estate under Bankruptcy Code section 541 (c)(2)?" moaned Crafty. Why, indeed?
34. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
35. Id. at 829 (citations omitted).
36. See Miss. CoDE ANN. § 85-3-l(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1984).
37. Most cases recently considering the issue have held that state exemption statutes were preempted by
ERISA. The only case to date narrowly construing Mackey and holding that a state exemption statute that men-
tioned ERISA, but did not conflict with ERISA, is In re Volpe.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988); ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 206 (d)(1), 88 Stat. 829, 864 (1974)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1988)).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)-(b)(2)(A) (1988).
40. At least five bankruptcy courts have held that ERISA-qualified funds are exempt as property that is ex-
empt under "other federal law": In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. WD. Tex. 1989); In re Burns, 108 Bankr.
308 (Bankr. WD. Okla. 1989); In re Messing, 114 Bankr. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990); In re Felts, 114 Bankr.
131 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); lnre Starkey, 116 Bankr. 259 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
41. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Gent pondered that question as the waves lapped over his toes. "Lawyers and
judges don't want doctors to keep large sums of money in their self-directed retire-
ment plans when they go belly up, regardless of what their lobbyists might sneak
by Congress or the Legislature," thought Gent. "Get me another pina colada,"
said Mr. Del I. Gent.
IV. WHAT HATH Goff WROUGHT?
Just what exactly in Goff made Crafty (and Spentitall) cry? "The damn list
didn't have ERISA in it. That list is not part of the statute," ranted Practice. "It's
not even an exclusive list. Goff is about spendthrift trusts, not about 'other federal
law.' The Fifth Circuit spent five (5) pages extolling the virtue of an Iowa Bank-
ruptcy judge's opinion42 that ignores the plain language of section 522(b)(2)(A) in
favor of an illustrative list in the legislative history that doesn't include ERISA.""
The Fifth Circuit discussed this legislative history in dicta in Goff:
The failure of Congress to include ERISA in its listing of illustrative federal statutes
is highly probative of congressional intent that ERISA was not within the group of
"federal law" based exemptions ....
Given the extensive and general reach of ERISA-qualified plans, it is highly im-
probable that Congress intended their inclusion without mention in the section
522(b)(2)(A) exemption in the midst of a listing of significantly less comprehensive
and less well known statutes. The often-stated admonition that it may be treacher-
ous to attach great weight to congressional silence in interpreting its laws does not
apply in this case in light of the comprehensive consideration of this issue which is
revealed by this history."
42. See In re Graham, 24 Bankr. 305 (N.D. Iowa 1982), affd, 726 E2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
43. In the House and Senate reports explaining the "other federal law" provision of II U.S.C. §522(b)(2)(A),
Congress provided a list of illustrative property which might be exempted under the Bankruptcy Code. Funds in
ERISA-qualified plans are not in the list, even though several types of public retirement funds are listed. The list
is quoted in Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 1983), and is reprinted in COLLIERS 1990
pamphlet edition of the Code:
Subsection (b), the operative subsection of this section, is a significant departure from present law. It per-
mits an individual debtor in a bankruptcy case a choice between exemption systems. The debtor may choose
the federal exemptions prescribed in subsection (d), or he may choose the exemptions to which he is entitled
under other federal law and the law of the State of his domicile. If the debtor chooses the latter, some of the
items that may be exempted under other Federal laws include:
- Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104; [Ed. Note: 22 U.S.C. § 4060
replaced repealed 22 U.S.C. § 1104, which was the applicable statutory provision at the time of the en-
actment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.]
- Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407;
- Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C. § 1717;
- Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. § 601;
- Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. §§ 729, 2265;
- Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits, 33 U.S.C. §
916;
- Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. § 228(L);
- Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. § 352(E); [Ed. Note: Correct citation is 38 U.S.C. §§ 770(g), and 3101.]
- Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C. § 3101; and
- Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C. § 175.
H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
44. Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1988). This is the majority view as shown in note
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"Congressional silence!" screamed Crafty. "I lose because Congress left
ERISA off of a list that wasn't even part of the statute. Who was on that panel,
anyway?""
V. THE MississiPpi DECISION:
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. McLeod
All of this brings us back to our original question: Are retirement funds exempt
in Mississippi? The answer is, it depends. For a debtor who files bankruptcy,
ERISA-qualified retirement funds are not exempt according to Deposit Guaranty
National Bank v. McLeod. 46 For a debtor who does not file bankruptcy, the anti-
alienation provision of ERISA, section 206(d)(1), would apparently keep
ERISA-qualified funds beyond the reach of creditors."7 Goffs analysis that bank-
ruptcy law supersedes ERISA' obviously does not apply if the debtor is not in
bankruptcy.
Deposit Guaranty affirmed the bankruptcy court decision of Judge Gaines in In
re McLeod.49 Deposit Guaranty and McLeod each hold that ERISA preempts the
Mississippi exemption statute. 5 McLeod also held that ERISA-qualified plans are
not exempt under "other federal law," pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(A), following
the dicta of Goff. ' Although Deposit Guaranty affirmed McLeod, 2 Deposit Guar-
anty did not discuss the issue of "other federal law" exemptions available under
section 522(b)(2)(A).
Curiously, Deposit Guaranty cites with approval In re Komet 3 on the preemp-
tion issue. Komet follows the preemption rationale of Mackey, but vigorously at-
tacks the dicta in Goff regarding the "other federal law" exemption 4 and holds that
the debtor's ERISA-qualified plan is exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A)."5 Al-
though Texas is not an opt-out state as Mississippi is, the debtor in Goffhad chosen
the state and other federal law exemptions under section 522(b)(2)(A).
45. (Johnson, Williams, and Jolly). Id. at 576.
46. No. H89-0183 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 1990).
47. In re Volpe, 100 Bankr. 840, 845 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (citing Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981)). In Mackey, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that ERISA
§ 206(d)(1) "bars (with certain numerated exceptions) the alienation or assignment of benefits provided for by
ERISA pension benefit plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Mackey, 486 U.S. 825, 836 (1988).
48. Goff, 706 F.2d at 587. The Court stated:
[T]he Bankruptcy Code was, generally, intended to broaden the "property of the estate" available to creditors
in bankruptcy and, specifically, intended to limit any exemption of pension funds. These policy-based provi-
sions of the Code would be frustrated were ERISA's anti-alienation and assignment provisions applied with a
sweeping brush. Thus, ERISA's specific provision precluding interference with the operation of federal law
renders the Bankruptcy Code effective over any ERISA provisions to the contrary.
Id.
49. 102 Bankr. 60 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989).
50. Deposit Guaranty, No. H89-0183, slip op. at 3; In re McLeod, 102 Bankr. 60, 63 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
1989).
51. McLeod, 102 Bankr. at 63.
52. Deposit Guaranty, No. H89-0183, slip op.
53. In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (original opinion, 93 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1988) withdrawn).
54. Konet, 104 Bankr. at 813-16.
55.Id. at 816-17.
1990]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
VI. In re Komet: MUST WE WAIT ANOTHER SEVENTY-SIX
YEARS TO SEE THE LIGHT?
Wake up, Crafty, and file an appeal. Will somebody get Gent off of the beach
and tell him to read Komet and let us know what he thinks. Crafty and Gent should
also read several recent articles reviewing cases on the exemption of ERISA-qual-
ified pension plans. 6 While the reasoning of Komet is persuasive, Komet faces an
uphill battle because "nearly every court that has considered the issue has held that
Congress did not intend to allow a non-bankruptcy federal exemption for ERISA
plans."57 Three other circuits have followed Goff, without expanding its reason-
ing, while no circuit has adopted Komet's reasoning or holding.58
No circuit has ruled on this issue since Mackey. However, the Fourth Circuit
has parted company with the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits by hold-
ing that ERISA-qualfied plan funds are excluded from the estate under 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2).59 Mackey strongly suggests that ERISA § 206(d)(1) is a "federal law"
exemption6" notwithstanding its exclusion from the "non-exclusive" list relied
upon by Goff.61 This point is not lost in Komet: "The Mackey Court does not
shrink from characterizing ERISA § 206(d) as, functionally, a federal exemp-
tion."62
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting en banc,
has followed Komet in In re Burns. 63 Burns, adopting a broad reading of Mackey,
concluded that the state exemption statute was preempted." Burns also concluded
that the ERISA plans in question did not qualify as spendthrift trusts under Okla-
homa law and were therefore not excluded from the estate under § 541 (c)(2). "
The Burns court held: "ERISA plans may be exempted from the bankruptcy estate
under § 522(b)(2)(A), as 'property that is exempt under Federal law, other than [§
522(d)] . . "66 Burns implies that the Goffanalysis "[flies] in the face of ERI-
56. See, e.g., Sterbach, Weiss & Salerno, Pre-Bankruptcy Planning for Professionals and ERISA-Qualified
Pension Plans: Are State Created Statutory Exemptions D. O.A. in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 94 COMM. L.J. 229
(1989).
57. Id. at 243-48. The authors analyze in detail the Komet opinion by Judge Clark, which they praise as
"scholarly and well articulated," and "provid[ing] an interesting (although not surefire) alternative argument for
debtors faced with preemption of a state ERISA pension plan statute." Id. at 243.
58. Komet, 104 Bankr. at 808 n.21. SeeIn re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1359-61 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (1 1th Cir. 1985); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268,
1274 (8th Cir. 1984). The Bankruptcy Court opinion inln re Graham, 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982),
provided the reasoning for the dicta in Goff, which has been followed by the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits.
59. Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1478-89 (4th Cir. 1990).
60. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836.
61. Goff 706 F.2d at 583.
62. In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799, 807 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
63. 108 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
64. Id. at 311.
65. Id. at 313.
66. Id. at 315.
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SA's principle purpose. "67 In its conclusion, the Burns court addressed one reason
why the bankruptcy courts are having so much difficulty with the exemption of
ERISA funds by stating: "This court fully recognizes that as a result of [the] deci-
sion in this case, a substantial sum will be withheld from creditors and preserved
for the benefit of debtors."68
VII. In re Volpe: LIMITING Mackey
Another bankruptcy judge in the Western District of Texas allowed debtors to
keep their retirement plans in In re Volpe .69  The court in Volpe distinguished
Mackey and held that the Texas statute creating an exemption for private retire-
ment funds was not preempted by ERISA because it did not purport to regulate the
terms and conditions of employee plans. The court held that any relationship be-
tween the Texas exemption statute and ERISA was simply "too tenuous, remote
and peripheral . . . to 'relate to' employee benefit plans within the meaning of 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a)."7
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, in In re Martinez,71
has been the only court to follow Volpe. Sterbach, Weiss, and Salerno argue that
Volpe's reliance on language in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 72 to limit the "relate to"
language of Mackey is misplaced:
On close inspection, it seems that the Volpe Court failed to note that Shaw rejected
the view that preemption applies only when state laws attempt to affect or regulate an
area expressly covered by ERISA. In sum, the Volpe Court ignored or overlooked
67. Id. The court stated as follows:
In this court's opinion, the analysis of the Komet court is correct, represents the proper interpretation of the
statute in question, and should be followed. The stated policy of ERISA is, inter alia, "to protect . . . the
interests of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries . . . . "29 U.S.C. § 1001. In order
to provide a degree of uniformity, ERISA preempts State law relating to such plans. By such preemption,
ERISA effectively thwarts the clear State policy which would afford its citizens exemptions from the claims
of their creditors fur such plans. However, ERISA itself provides protections from claims of creditors for
qualifying plans. To hold that these protections are similarly ineffectual, simply because the Congress failed
to specify ERISA in a nonexclusive list of legislative examples in the legislative history, would fly in the face
of ERISA's principle [sic] purpose. Id.
68. Burns, 108 Bankr. at 315. Very few bankruptcy courts would allow debtors to keep $700,000 in a retire-
ment fund, as this court did. However, the court also recognized that allowing creditors to reach retirement funds
may not be a "good" result in other cases.
[The court] also recognizes that this decision will constitute precedent within this district, and that it will
have the same effect upon other debtors, and their creditors, who are similarly situated. It is noted, however,
that the decision may also have the effect of protecting from creditors far more modest accumulations of capi-
tal for the benefit of debtors who have no other source or prospect of funding for their welfare or retirement.
Section § [sic] 522(b)(2)(A) contains no monetary or other limitations. It is not for this court, by judicial
fiat, to establish any such limitations, whether based upon this court's personal perception of fairness and
equity or otherwise. Should the Congress determine that some limitation upon the available exemption is
appropriate, or that ERISA plans should not be includable under § 522(b)(2)(A), it is within its province, not
that of this or any other court, to enact appropriate legislation in furtherance of such determination.
Id. at 315-16.
69. 100 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
70. Id. at 849.
71. 107 Bankr. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
72. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
1990]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
the broad interpretation and application of the phrase "relate to" espoused by the
United States Supreme Court in Shaw, and underscored in Mackey. 
73
VIII. WHAT ABOUT IRA's?
Through all of this the second question remains unanswered. Are IRA's exempt
in Mississippi? The Mississippi exemption statute says IRA's are exempt. 74 How-
ever, the Mississippi exemption statute also implies that IRA's are qualified under
ERISA. Both Judge Gaines and Judge Wingate discuss this issue in McLeod and
Deposit Guaranty, implying that IRA's are not exempt.
71
In re Ewel1P6 considered a similar argument based on a Florida statute which ex-
empted IRA's. Unlike the Mississippi statute which classifies IRA's as a subsec-
tion of ERISA-qualified plans, Florida's statute deals separately with IRA's:
"[A]ny interest in a ... plan that is qualified under section 401(a), s. 403(a), s.
403(b), s. 408 or s. 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, is
exempt from all claims of creditors of the beneficiary or participant.
77
73. Sterbach, Weiss & Salerno, Pre-Bankruptcy Planning, supra note 18, at 249 n.82.
74. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1989).
75. Judge Gaines discusses the issue in In re McLeod as follows:
The debtor has also argued that even if the Court determines that the state exemptions are preempted, the
debtor may still exempt his interest in certain IRA and Keogh plans upon the premise that they are not covered
by ERISA, and, therefore, the state exemption statute would not be preempted by ERISA as to those funds.
The debtor misreads the Mississippi statute on this point.
Section 85-3-1(1)(b)(iii) of the Mississippi Code provides that there shall be exempt from seizure, "All
property and pension trusts which are qualified under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) (P.L. No. 93-406), including, but not limited to, self-employment retirement (Keogh) plans and in-
dividual retirement accounts (IRA)." (emphasis added). Under the language of this statute, there is no ex-
emption provided for any pension fund unless it is qualified under ERISA. Therefore, the debtor may not
claim exemptions under this section whether the pension plans are qualified under ERISA or not, and the
Court need not determine whether each fund is so qualified under ERISA.
It is interesting to note that the debtor's amended schedule B-4 on exemption, filed April 17, 1989, lists
$515,511.88 in "vested, unmatured interest in ERISA-qualified retirement funds." The last memorandum
filed by the debtor, in which the argument that certain funds are not ERISA funds, was received by the Court
on March 23, 1989. By filing the amended schedule B-4 on exemptions, and by the failure to list thereon any
non-ERISA funds as exempt, the debtor has effectively abandoned his own argument.
In re McLeod, 102 Bankr. 60, 64-65 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989). Judge Wingate discusses the IRA issue in De-
posit Guaranty as follows:
The defendant has also presented the case ofln re Calvin E. Ewell, 104 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1989), a
case which held that Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's) under certain sections of Title 26 of the Internal
Revenue Code could be exempt from the claims of creditors, notwithstanding ERISA preemption. However,
this decision made no reference whatsoever to the Mackey case, and was subsequently rejected by the same
court in the case of In re Bryant, 106 B.R. 727 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1989). This court has reviewed the au-
thorities on this point, and hereby determines that the bankruptcy court's decision is correct. See, In re Dyke,
99 B.R. 343 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Tex. 1989); In re Hirsch, 98 B.R. 1 (Bkrtcy. D. Ariz. 1988). Additionally, this
court finds that the defendant clearly and unequivocally designated the assets in question as ERISA qualified
on schedule B-4 in the bankruptcy court and finds no error in the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the assets
in question were thereby subjected to ERISA preemption of state law exemptions. The court also agrees that
there would be no exemption at all if the assets in question were not covered by ERISA.
Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. McLeod, No. H89-0183 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 1990).
76. 104 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
77. FLA. STAT. § 222.2 l(2)(a) (1987).
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Notwithstanding Judge Wingate's statement to the contrary,78 Ewell does dis-
cuss Mackey, but holds that IRA's are not covered by ERISA or its preemption.
79
IX. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND 1 1 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)
Many of the cases in which debtors have attempted to protect ERISA-qualified
funds, and trustees and creditors have attempted to reach the funds for satisfaction
of their debtors, have turned on whether the ERISA-qualified funds should be ex-
cluded from property of the estate under Title 11 U.S. C. § 541 (c)(2).8 Section
541 (c)(2) excludes from the debtor's estate properties which are subject to restric-
tions on transfer of the beneficial interest of the debtor under trust; such restric-
tions are enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law. Until the Fourth
Circuit decided in In re Moore,81 the courts have uniformly held that where an
ERISA plan did not also qualify as a spendthrift trust under state law, ERISA plan
benefits could not be excluded from the estate under section 541(c)(2).82 Indeed,
the debtor in McLeod recognized that his ERISA plan was not a spendthrift trust
under Mississippi law and stipulated that the ERISA funds were property of the
estate. 83
The Fourth Circuit in In re Moore rejected the notion that the term "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" is limited to state spendthrift trust law. According to Moore:
"Applicable nonbankruptcy law" means precisely what it says: all laws, state and
federal, under which a transfer restriction is enforceable. Nothing in the phrase "ap-
78. Deposit Guaranty, H89-0183(W) at 2-3.
79. Ewell, 104 Bankr. at 460-61. In Mackey, the Supreme Court held that a Georgia statute exempting "em-
ployee welfare benefit plans" from garnishment was preempted by ERISA, therefore, the exemption created by
the Georgia statute could not be enforced. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830. The Court struck down the Georgia statute
on the strength of ERISA, § 514(a) which provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter [ERISA Title I] and
subchapter III of this chapter [ERISA Title IV] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003 (a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
Section 1002(3) defines "employee benefit plan" as a welfare or pension plan which is established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization which represents employees. 29 U. S. C. § 1002(3) (1988). Even
a cursory examination of § 514(a) leaves no doubt that its preemption provision is not applicable to IRA ac-
counts. For instance, an individual who establishes an IRA for himself is not necessarily an employer or an em-
ployee organization. In addition, ERISA expressly excludes IRA's from its coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6)
(1988).
80. See Watson v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid), 917 E2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
81. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
82. See, e.g., Goff, 706 F2d at 580; Ewell, 104 Bankr. at 459-60.
83. McLeod, 102 Bankr. at 62.
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plicable nonbankruptcy law" or in the remainder of § 541(c)(2) suggests that the
phrase refers exclusively to state law, much less to state spendthrift trust law.8
Under the Moore analysis, any restriction on transfer enforceable under an
ERISA plan would be enforceable to exclude the plan from the bankruptcy estate.
It is not clear from the McLeod decision whether Dr. McLeod's plan would have
contained enforceable transfer restrictions, although we can assume that as an
ERISA-qualified plan, it contained some if not all of the transfer restrictions re-
quired by ERISA.
The Ninth Circuit refused to follow Moore in In re Kincaid.85 In that case the
court ruled that state spendthrift trust law is not preempted by ERISA, while fol-
lowing In re Daniel,86 in holding that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under §
541(c)(2) is limited to state spendthrift trust law.87 In a concurring opinion, Cir-
cuit Judge Fletcher would have followed the reasoning of Moore, and attacks the
reasoning of Daniel (and by implication Gof):
As Daniel permits no harmonization of federal bankruptcy law and ERISA law, and
as it undercuts the purposes of ERISA, no doubt one day our court must face di-
rectly the serious problems it presents*88
If state spendthrift trust law determines whether a plan is excluded and all plans
contain spendthrift provisions in order to qualify for favorable tax treatment, then
the issue in Mississippi will be whether equity will deny enforcement of the spend-
thrift provisions.89
Factors which the courts have considered to determine whether to enforce the
spendthrift provisions under state law include ownership and control of the plan,
employer contributions, termination of employment, loan provisions, and hard-
ship distributions." The court in Kincaid considered each of these factors to de-
termine whether the plan qualified as a spendthrift trust. 1
84. 907 F.2d 1476 at 1477 (4th Cir. 1990). Moore discussed the fact that four other circuits have construed §
541(c)(2) to refer only to state spendthrift trust law as follows:
We acknowledge that several circuit courts have read the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in §
541(c)(2) narrowly to refer only to state spendthrift trust law. See In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1985); In reLichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (1 th Cir. 1985); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); In re
Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). These decisions have, in the main, involved self-settled trusts in which
the settlor is the beneficiary with the power to amend or to terminate the trust without penalty, whereas, here
the beneficiaries do not control the plan, cannot make unrestricted withdrawals from it, cannot borrow
against it, and cannot amend it. The decisions have reached the conclusion that "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" refers solely to state spendthrift trust law based on the legislative history of § 541(c)(2). Because we
believe this legislative history to be irrelevant and in any event inconclusive, we respectfully decline to follow
this course.
907 F.2d at 1478.
85. 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
86. 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985).
87. 917 F.2d at 1166.
88. Id. at 1170.
89. See Golden, What Have We Stepped Into? Qualified Plans in Bankruptcy, FAULKNER & GRAv's BANKR.
L.R., (1990).
90. Id.
91. 917 F.2d at 1166-68.
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X. THE ROCK AND THE HARD PLACE
End of story? Not quite. Spentitall does not have possession of his retirement
funds. Those assets are held in the plan, and the plan is administered by a trustee.
"No problem," says Gent. "Just get the bankruptcy court judge to order the plan
trustee to turn over the funds."
What is the plan trustee's reaction to all of this? If he is at all versed in his fidu-
ciary responsibilities as a plan trustee, he will object to any order of the bank-
ruptcy court to turn over plan assets to creditors. The Internal Revenue Service,
Goff notwithstanding, looks with a jaundiced eye at plan trustees who turn over
plan assets in violation of the anti-alienation provision of ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code. As Al Capone could attest, you just do not mess with the IRS.
"What does the IRS have to do with all this?" cries Gent. "The IRS has no au-
thority to countermand a bankruptcy court order."
Gent is right, for what it is worth. The IRS will not tell the plan trustee to disre-
gard the bankruptcy court order. The IRS will simply point out that, if the plan
trustee does comply with the order, Spentitall's plan loses its tax-qualified status
as of the date of the prohibited assignment of plan assets.2 Why should that con-
cern the plan trustee? Because under ERISA § 3(21), the trustee is a fiduciary
and, under ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), a fiduciary has a duty to administer the plan in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan. If the plan
trustee complies with a bankruptcy court order in violation of the plan's anti-alien-
ation provisions, he is subject to civil and criminal penalties under ERISA §§ 501
and 502. In addition, under ERISA § 409, a fiduciary who breaches his obliga-
tions with respect to the plan may be personally liable to make good to the plan any
losses to the plan resulting from the breach.
These might include taxes due to plan participants as a result of disqualification.
Since the bankruptcy filing itself results in a transfer of property of the estate, the
filing of bankruptcy by one plan participant may disqualify the entire plan. Once
the plan becomes disqualified, the contributions to the plan made by the employer
become currently taxable to the employees, even though they will not actually re-
ceive the funds until retirement. Needless to say, it does not take too many em-
ployees participating in a plan for the tax liability to mount to astronomical sums.
92. The court dismissed this argument in In re Poe, 118 Bankr. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990):
The Plan Administrator raises a "red herring" in its second argument. The Plan Administrator contends that
if this Court enforces the clear provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that this would be an improper distribution
of the retirement fund and it would lose its tax exempt status. Apparently the Plan Administrator is arguing
that if he has to turn over to the Trustee the Debtor's interest in the fund this would destroy the tax exempt
status of the fund for all the other thousands of employees of Atlantic Richfield Company. The Plan Adminis-
trator cites no authority for this draconian result other than private letter rulings of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice issued some 10 years ago. These letters state that any unauthorized disbursement would disqualify an
entire plan from tax exempt status.
This argument has been addressed by other courts and rejected. See Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1982); In re DiPiazza, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1979) provides in substance that nothing in the ERISA statute
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the United States.
Since it is clear that pension funds are part of the Debtor's estate, unless they are part of a spenthrift trust, any
provision of ERISA that prevents a distribution to a trustee in bankruptcy would fail.
1990l
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XI. LEGISLATIVE REFORM: WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Have Congress and the Mississippi legislature clearly articulated their intent re-
garding whether ERISA-qualified pension benefits should be beyond the reach of
creditors? The generic federal exemption regarding retirement benefits, out of
which Mississippi opted, provides: "The following property may be exempted un-
der subsection (b)(1) of this section: . . . (10) The debtors right to receive- ...
(E) a payment under a . . .pension . . . plan . . to the extent necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor . . .,.
Since Mississippi opted out, it has available the state exemptions and other fed-
eral exemptions. The Mississippi ERISA exemptions are preempted under
Mackey,94 and the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA do not qualify as a federal
exemption available to opt-out states under Goff.9 Even though the Mississippi
legislature stated unequivocally that all ERISA-qualified pension funds are ex-
empt96 and Congress said those funds cannot be assigned or alienated,97 those
funds are subject to the claims of creditors in bankruptcy.
Regarding IRA's, even though the Mississippi exemption statute intended to ex-
empt IRA's, it erroneously refers to IRA's as qualified under ERISA. As such, the
exempting language is probably preempted, and McLeod has so held.98 The solu-
tion for IRA's is simple. The legislature should simply separate the language ex-
empting IRA's from the ERISA exempting language.
The solution for ERISA-qualified plans is not so clear. One possible solution is
suggested by the holding in Mackey that specific references to ERISA in the state
statute will result in preemption. 9 The general Georgia garnishment statute,
while it might have some effect on ERISA-qualified welfare benefit plans, did not
"relate to" ERISA because ERISA-qualified plans were not singled out for special
treatment. 00 An Iowa bankruptcy court has held that Iowa's exemption statute is
not preempted by ERISA since it makes no reference to ERISA or to attendant IRS
provisions.l°1 Iowa's generic exemption section provides as follows:
A debtor who is a resident of this state may hold exempt from execution the following
property: ...
8. The debtor's rights in: ...
e. A payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of ill-
93. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
94. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829. The Court stated that "ERISA § 514(a) preempts 'any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan' covered by the statute." Id.
95. Goff, 706 F.2d at 579.
96. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1 (Supp. 1989).
- 97. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 206(d)(1), 88 Stat. 829, 864 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
1056 (1988)).
98. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
99. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829.
100. d. at 831.
101. In re Bartlett, 116 Bankr. 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990).
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ness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary
for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. 
102
The bankruptcy court holds that the Iowa statute is not preempted by ERISA.
The Bartlett court states:
Iowa Code section 627.6(8)(e) is generic on its face. It can not be construed as mak-
ing any reference to ERISA or to attendant IRS provisions. Thus, it is not preempted
by ERISA section 514(a).
103
Kansas has adopted a novel approach. Its exemption statute provides that all
ERISA-qualified pension plans "shall be conclusively presumed to be a spend-
thrift trust under [Kansas exemption statutes] and the common law of the state [of
Kansas].'"14 To legislate that all ERISA-qualified plans are spendthrift trusts, the
Mississippi legislature would have to ignore strong language from the Mississippi
Supreme Court holding that a self-settled trust cannot be a spendthrift trust under
Mississippi law:
Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts are permitted, the settlor cannot
create a spendthrift trust for his own benefit .... If it were so that the settlor could
reach the funds (in the trust), we think the creditors should be able to reach them;
and that which the California court said in In re Camm's Estate, 76 Cal. App. 2d
104, 172 P.2d 547 (1946), is appropos, and at least in line with our sense of justice
and right:
If this trust, as to the accrued and accumulated income to which the settlor was
entitled before death could be upheld as against this creditor's claim, it would be pos-
sible for anyone to create a trust for his benefit in which he retained the right to re-
ceive and use all income during his life, with remainder to another at the moment of
death, free from claims of creditors, and then keep large credit accounts running and
die leaving his debts unpaid, thus cheating his creditors. Equity will not permit
this. 105
XII. CONCLUSION
As it now stands, self-employed individuals, professionals, and others with
self-settled retirement trusts are not allowed to exempt their ERISA-qualified re-
tirement funds nor are they allowed to exempt their IRA's in Mississippi if they file
bankruptcy. This may change if the Fifth Circuit reconsiders its holding in Goff in
light of the arguments in Komet and Moore. The legislature could very easily ad-
dress the problem relating to IRA's, but any state statute dealing with private re-
tirement funds faces probable preemption. Meanwhile, lawyers will continue to
drink cold sodas and pina coladas.
102. IowA CODE § 627.6(8)(e) (Supp. 1990).
103. 116 Bankr. at 1023.
104. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2308(b) (1989) (Supp. 1989).
105. Deposit Guaranty Nat'il Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204 So. 2d 856, 860, 862 (Miss. 1967) (empha-
sis added).
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